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Abstract: This research builds upon and extends earlier research by studying whether people leave
their homes and migrate to other states due to weather changes associated with climate variability.
In particular, I examine how push and pull factors jointly influence emigration. Empirically, the
theoretical arguments are analysed quantitatively with time-series cross-section data on transnational
migration since the 1960s. The results suggest that climate indicators are strongly and robustly asso-
ciated with transnational migration. The dyadic nature of the analysis allows for a close examination
of patterns across pairs of countries by clearly distinguishing between “source” and “destination.”
Controlling for unobserved influences via country and year fixed effects, as well as a series of robust-
ness checks, further increases the confidence in this finding. This research substantially improves our
understanding of climate-induced migration and emphasizes that it is, in fact, a global phenomenon.
Keywords: climate variability; temperature; precipitation; transnational migration; dyadic analysis
1. Introduction
The argument on climate variability inducing migration is usually based on individu-
als’ capability and opportunity to leave their homes [1]. People look for life satisfaction in
suitable and safe areas [2,3]. In the presence of an environmental event, people move from
one area to another within their state (e.g., [4]). If environment factors have a major impact,
e.g., to such an extent that the state is unable to respond to the adaptation needs of its popu-
lation as a whole, they do influence the state as a whole as well. Under those circumstances,
intrastate migration may not be a viable option, and people will then increasingly consider
transnational emigration [5]. Thus, I stress the phenomenon of transnational migration
with regards to climate variability, with a focus on asking: where does the environmentally
affected individual go to? Considering the consequences of transnational migration, such
as economic instability or diseases [6], finding evidence for transnational environmental
migrants will highlight that climate-induced migration is, in fact, a global phenomenon.
Studies focusing on transnational migration flows due to variability in the weather
are limited in both theory and empirics. For instance, Beine and Parsons [7] concentrate
on the impact of temperature and rainfall averages on international migration, but only
until the year 2000 (I use the terms “international” and “transnational” interchangeably).
Backhaus et al. [8] analyze how temperature and precipitation affect migration flows with
a dyadic setup and, thus, capture push and pull factors. However, they rely on a sample of
142 countries of origin and only 19 OECD destination countries, which implicitly assumes
that migration only occurs from the “global South” to the “global North”. Cattaneo
and Peri [5] also study international migration due to low agricultural productivity that
is affected by high temperatures in countries of origin, but thereby merely provide an
analysis of indirect effects. While I build upon these works, I also seek to extend and go
beyond them by offering an “inclusive study” of transnational migration not only on the
countries of origin but also on the destination countries. Additionally, I examine direct
effects of climate variability on transnational migration and I analyze a longer time period
(from 1960 to 2010), and a larger set of countries (i.e., up to 186 states; not only OECD
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countries), which allows me to maximize the generalizability of my results over earlier
work. This is important both from a scientific perspective and a policy point of view.
Eventually, therefore, I circumvent the limitations of previous studies with regards to a
narrow theoretical focus (mostly indirect effects) or the empirical analysis (small spatial
and temporal coverage). My findings suggest that higher positive temperature shocks
make people to migrate from their countries to lower-temperature countries, which is likely
to have crucial implications globally—and not only within specific states as such.
2. The Links of Climate Variability to Transnational Migration
The causes of migration are complex and, to a large degree, context-specific [1].
People choose to migrate only as a last resort as substantial costs are usually associated
with migration [4]. Hence, migration might be driven by a series of factors that are
typically intertwined and generate less favorable living conditions. As a result, people
deliberately decide or are somewhat “forced” to leave their homes, looking for a new place
to live. In terms of the influences at the “source location,” the literature usually focuses
on push factors, distinguishing between willingness and opportunity aspects. Declining
economic growth, low business activity, high levels of unemployment, and poverty are
all (interlinked) determinants that push people to migrate out of their countries looking
for employment and better living standards in other states. Opportunity and willingness
define people’s decision to move elsewhere [9]. Literature refers to the willingness factors
as “stressors” that affect people’s living satisfaction and could potentially impact on their
willingness to emigrate [3,10–12]. On the other hand, opportunity factors at the destination
define people’s decision on where to migrate to, e.g., social and economic opportunities [13].
My main argument is twofold. First, climate variability is likely to affect a country
in its entirety. Although within-country variation of climate variability clearly exists, it is
usually not the case that only a few, remote areas within a nation experience the impact
of an altered climate [14]. When the climate changes, this directly affects the country as a
whole (stressors/“push” factors). Consider the case of smaller island nations, for example:
Farbotko [15] and Farbotko and Lazrus [16], among others, highlight that inhabitants of
low-lying atolls are simply forced to leave their “sinking” and “disappearing” countries.
In the case of larger countries, the problem lies on adaptation that is either too expensive
or it might require too much time to develop an effect [17]. For instance, McAdam and
Loughry [18] focus on migration in the small islands of Kiribati and Tuvalu (“shrinking
islands”) and claim that climatic change along other socio-economic development has
forced people to migrate. The authors argue that “the islands will be uninhabitable by the
middle of this century whilst their people will be the world’s first climate refugees” [18].
People are forced not only to domestically migrate from one area to another, but also to look
for another country, e.g., Australia or New Zealand in this case. Second, people do not only
consider the necessity of moving (defined by the current living conditions), but they also
take into account the conditions that they will face in the new environment (opportunity or
“pull” factors). Having experienced climate variability in the country of origin, individuals
are looking for environmental quality, and a more stable environment with better living
conditions. Emigration is therefore jointly influenced by “push” and “pull” factors.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Data and Dependent Variable
For the empirical test of my hypothesis, I use time-series cross-sectional data. The
unit of analysis is dyad country-year between 1960 and 2010. The availability of data
determines this spatio-temporal domain. For the outcome variable, data on migrants are
taken from the World Bank over the last five decades, i.e., 1960–2010, and refer to “migrant
stocks” (as defined by the World Bank), i.e., the total number of people born in a country
other than that in which they live [19,20]. I transformed this information to the stock of
migrants between two countries, i.e., the country of origin and the destination. The World
Bank data are compiled from national census rounds, which are usually conducted in
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10-year windows; missing data between two consecutive rounds are linearly interpolated
(Note the robustness check in the appendix that omits all interpolated or imputed country
years, and only relies on actually observed values of the migration item). The variable of
emigrants is also logged transformed. This data allows a global empirical examination of
transnational migration that aims to add to previous studies with a focus on either OECD
countries (e.g., [8,21]) or developing countries [22].
Given the continuous dependent variable, I employ ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression models to empirically test my hypothesis. I also cluster the standard errors
by dyad to capture intra-group correlations. Serially correlated errors within countries
might be possible; the temporally lagged dependent variable addresses this [23]. I also
employ year-fixed effects to control for temporal shocks that are common for all states in a
given year (e.g., economic crises, EU accession rounds). Country-fixed effects capture any
time-invariant unit-level (domestic) influences.
3.2. Explanatory Variables
For the temperature and precipitation data, I follow Landis [24] and use the data from
NOAA’s NCEP/NCAR Reanalysis Monthly Means Dataset 1948–2011 (in degrees Celsius)
and monthly precipitation data (mm/month) from the Global Precipitation Climatology
Project Version 2.2, respectively. Following Landis [24], I aggregated these data at the
country level and employ measures of temperature and precipitation shocks. A tempera-
ture/precipitation shock is a substantial (or extreme) deviation from a “normal” climate
pattern, i.e., the standardized temperature/precipitation deviation (see [25]). Shocks in tem-
perature and precipitation increase climate variability with immediate effects. For example,
countries affected by low levels of precipitation suffer from various extreme conditions, in-
cluding droughts. This “can cause disruptions in economic and social systems” [24] (p. 606)
and [26], especially in vulnerable societies with low adaptability measures. Specifically, as
described in detail in Landis [24] (p. 608), measures of temperature and precipitation shock
use the monthly deviation from a country’s long-term monthly mean. These can be either
negative or positive deviations (not absolute values). More information on the explanatory
variables can be found in the Appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates the temperature shock rates (in Celsius) in the world between 1948
and 2010. Figure 2 illustrates precipitation shocks in each origin country between 1979 and
2011, measured in millimeters (mm).
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planatory variables are lagged by one year.  
Figure 1. World map for yearly average temperatures shocks—origin country. To facilitate the illustration of the tempera-
tures, I employed four different temperature shock categories where light red colour refers to low temperatures and dark
red colour to high temperatures. White colour indicates no i formation. Temperature shock rates (in Celsius) in the world
between 1948 and 2010 (averaged across years for each origin country).
Sustainability 2021, 13, 405 4 of 13
Sustainability 2021, 13, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 13 
 
 
Figure 1. World map for yearly average temperatures shocks—origin country. To facilitate the illustration of the temper-
atures, I employed four different temperature shock categories where light red colour refers to low temperatures and dark 
red colour to high temperatures. White colour indicates no information. Temperature shock rates (in Celsius) in the world 
between 1948 and 2010 (averaged across years for each origin country). 
 
Figure 2. World map for yearly average precipitation shocks—origin country. To facilitate the illustration of the precipi-
tation levels, I employed four different precipitation shocks categories. Dark green pertains to high levels of precipitation, 
while lighter greens pertain to lower levels of precipitation. White colour indicates no information. Precipitation shocks 
in each country between 1979 and 2009, measured in millimeters (mm) (averaged across years for each origin country). 
In terms of the control variables described in Table 1, I consider a set of indicators 
that have been identified as possible influences of the willingness and opportunity for 
translational migration [12,27,28]. In order to address issues of simultaneity bias, all ex-
planatory variables are lagged by one year.  
Figure 2. World map for yearly average precipitation shocks—origin country. To facilitate the illustration of the precipitation
levels, I employed four different precipitation shocks categories. Dark green pertains to high levels of precipitation, while
lighter greens pertain to lower levels of precipitation. White colour indicates no information. Precipitation shocks in each
country between 1979 and 2009, measured in millimeters (mm) (averaged across years for each origin country).
In terms of th control varia s described in Table 1, I consi er a set of indicators
that have been identified as possible influences of the willingness and opportunity for
translational migration [12,27,28]. In order to address issues of simultaneity bias, all
explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Table 1. Control variables.
Definition Source
Cultural distance ln Standardized measure of cultural differences Kandogan’s [29] revised variable of Kogut and Singh’s [30]
Civil war At least 25 battle deaths Armed Conflict Database [31]
Democracy State’s regime (polity 2) Polity IV data set [32]
GDP per capita ln
Log-transformed
Countries’ economic output [33]
Population ln
Log-transformed
total number of humans living in a country [33]
Note: Refer to the Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the control variables.
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables discussed so far as well
as the variation inflation factors (VIFs) of the explanatory factors. According to the VIFs,
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major issue, since all VIFs are well below the common
threshold value of 5 [34].
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and VIF.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max VIF
Emigrants ln (lag) 307,614 −5.25 17.16 −34.54 16.27
Temperature shock (lag)—Origin 307,614 0.08 0.25 −0.87 1.76 1.06
Temperature shock (lag)—Destination 307,614 0.09 0.26 −1.83 1.79 1.07
Precipitation shock (lag)—Origin 307,614 0.01 0.23 −1.04 1.62 1.00
Precipitation shock (lag)—Destination 307,614 0.01 0.22 −1.04 1.65 1.01
Cultural distance ln (lag) 307,614 9.85 0.63 6.00 11.50 1.36
Civil war (lag)—Origin 307,614 0.05 0.23 0.00 1 1.04
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Table 2. Cont.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max VIF
Civil war (lag)—Destination 307,614 0.06 0.24 0.00 1 1.03
Democracy (lag)—Origin 307,614 4.57 6.81 −10 10 1.29
Democracy (lag)—Destination 307,614 1.68 7.26 −10 10 1.20
GDP per capita ln (lag)—Origin 307,614 8.89 1.09 5.45 10.77 1.58
GDP per capita ln (lag)—Destination 307,614 8.22 1.26 4.51 10.97 1.24
Population ln (lag)—Origin 307,614 10.01 1.90 6.78 21.01 1.32
Population ln (lag)—Destination 307,614 9.24 1.98 5.37 21.01 1.23
Notes: Data on precipitation only available for 1979 to 2009; all other items are available for 1960 to 2010.
4. Results
Model 1 in Table 3 omits control variables as they may actually increase the bias
instead of decreasing it [35]. Model 2 constitutes my full model, i.e., all control variables
are included.
Table 3. The impact of climate change on emigration (dyadic setting).
Model 1 Model 2
Temperature shock 0.16 *** 0.11 ***
(lag)—Origin (0.02) (0.03)
Temperature shock −0.17 *** −0.19 ***
(lag)—Destination (0.02) (0.03)
Precipitation (lag)—Origin −0.11 *** −0.17 ***
(0.02) (0.03)
Precipitation (lag)—Destination 0.07 *** 0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Cultural distanceln (lag) 0.06
(0.07)
Civil war (lag)—Origin −0.03
(0.03)




Democracy (lag)—Destination −0.01 ***
(0.00)
GDP per capitaln (lag)—Origin −0.20 ***
(0.04)




Population (lag)—Destination −1.93 ***
(0.11)
Constant −0.58 *** 22.40 ***
(0.00) (2.15)
Obs. 931,760 307,614
Lagged dependent variable Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors (dyad) Yes Yes
R2 0.96 0.95
RMSE 4.09 3.97
Notes: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered by countries are in parentheses; *** p < 0.01.
Due to the temporally lagged dependent variable, the coefficient estimates of all other
explanatory variables only reflect the short-term effect, i.e., the impact in a current year
(left panel in Figure 3). To estimate the asymptotic, long-term impact of the independent
variables, I re-estimate the individual coefficients by taking into account the coefficient of
the lagged dependent variable [36] (p. 336), Accordingly, I estimate asymptotic long-term
effects (in addition to short-term effects) for the main explanatory variables of Model 2 and
summarize them in Figure 3.
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vertical red line represents a marginal effect of 0; estimates are based on Model 2 (Table 3). Marginal effect estimates are
presented in the Appendix A in Tables A2 and A3.
The dyadic nature of the analysis allows for a detailed examination of the motivation
for emigration—not only in the country of origin, but also in the destination state. Put
differently, the results show what climatic conditions in the origin and destination country
drive emigration. Overall the results confirm the impact of climate variation and specifically
of hig er positive temperature shocks on transnational migration. At the same time,
migrants are more likely to migrate to those countries with colder temperature shocks. The
coefficient estimate of temperature shock (lag)—origin is 0.11 (Model 2). Given that the
outcome variable is log-transformed, the substantive short-term effect of temperature shock
is exp(0.11), i.e., for a one-unit increase in that variable, the geometric mean of emigrants
increases by 11.6 percent. Given the mean value of emigrants ln (lag) and the distribution
ranging in (−34.54; 16.27), an increase of 11.6 percent refers to about 363 people leaving.
The asymptotic long-term effect is 2.45. Although the short-term effect is, in fact, rather
small, the substantive long-term impact of temperature shocks highlights that an increase
in temperature is very high, considering that the size of a small-islanded country such as
the Republic of Nauru is just over 10,000 people.
The coefficient estimate of temperature shock (lag)—destination is −0.19 (Model 2),
the substantive short-term effect of temperature shock is −21 percent, i.e., for a one-
unit increase in that variable, the geometric mean of emigrants decreases by 21 percent,
and the asymptotic long-term effect is −4.32. This means that individuals from warmer-
temperature countries migrate to colder countries. Regarding the climate indicator of
precipitation, the coefficient estimate of the precipitation shock (lag) at the origin is −0.17,
the substantive short-term effect of precipitation shock at the origin is −18.5 percent,
i.e., for a one-unit increase in that variable, the geometric mean of emigrants decreases by
18.5 percent, and the asymptotic long-term effect is −3.84. This reflects previous findings on
precipitation that are, in general, ambiguous [37]. The precipitation shock indicator at the
destination does not have a significant impact on emigration though. These estimates are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Given that I control for a large set of alternative
explanations, including year- and country-fixed effects, there is strong confidence in the
validity of my findings.
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Moving to the rest of the explanatory variables of the analysis, the results show
that more democratic states do not attract migrants as they may have more restrictive
policies towards migration [38], while income levels play a significant role “at home” and
“abroad:” lower income levels in the source country lead to more emigration, while it is
precisely the other way around in the destination country, i.e., economically wealthier states
attract migrants more strongly than poorer nations (in the appendix, I offer an analysis
interacting temperature shock at the origin with unemployment rates at the destination
country) [39,40]. Moreover, population in the destination country is linked to Emigration
in a significant way. To further examine the robustness of this model, I examined the
predictive power of the main explanatory variables of interest via in-sample predictions
techniques in the Appendix A. The specifications employed perform well in predicting
transnational migration and clarifying the robustness of this empirical analysis.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
This note attempts to identify countries’ characteristics that determine environmental
migrants’ origin and destination. Among other drivers, environmental migrants look for
environmentally safe countries, i.e., not affected by temperature shocks. There are several
studies on the relationship between environmental change and migration, particularly at
the domestic, within-country level (e.g., [1,4]), and some at the international level with
limited coverage of countries and years (e.g., [6–8]). In this study, I took a different approach
by examining climate change induced transnational migration in a dyadic analysis.
The results strongly and robustly suggest that if a country experiences high positive
temperature shocks, migration is likely to occur across countries. The findings further
highlight a significant difference between the short- and long-term effects of temperature
shocks on transnational migration. In particular, individuals will be migrating from
countries with warmer shocks to countries with colder shocks. Meanwhile, the results for
precipitation shocks are rather mixed reflecting previous findings [37]. Higher precipitation
at the origin decreases migration whilst precipitation shock at the destination country is not
related to emigration. Given the consequences of migration at larger scales, many countries
will face adaptation and mitigation challenges not only due to the large migration flows,
but also as my results suggest, indirectly due to climate variability as well.
Based on this research and the analyses presented, future studies will identify condi-
tions under which climate variability effects are stronger or weaker, and what are other
climate indicators that could impact transnational migration. A question raised here is
whether the absence of adaptability measures in certain countries is already a driver for
people to preemptively migrate fearing for disastrous environmental consequences. More-
over, internal migration for social, economic, and political reasons is strongly linked to
people’s return, while transnational migration is frequently associated with lower rates
of return [41]. In terms of climate-induced migration, the conditions of return might look
even more different. A country that is affected by climatic changes will not be able to
recover due to the severity of the climate variability consequences (e.g., as demonstrated
by the challenges of small island states). That is, further research could move beyond the
consequences of climate-induced internal migration and examine further climate-induced
transnational migration and its consequences, e.g., grievances and conflicts.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
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Appendix A
I begin this appendix by presenting further information on the explanatory and
control variables included in the main analysis. The information on temperature comes
from the NOAA’s NCEP/NCAR Reanalysis Monthly Means Dataset 1948–2011 (in degrees
Celsius) [42]. These data provide surface or near surface air temperatures (at a 0.995 sigma
level) with spatial coverage of a 2.5 × 2.5-degree longitude native resolution (144 × 72).
Specifically, as described in detail in Landis [24] (p. 608), the temperature shock measure
“uses the monthly deviation from a country’s long-term monthly mean, indicated by
(Xitz − Xit-bar)/ait where Xitz is the mean temperature of country i in month t in year z,
Xit-bar is the panel mean of country i’s long-term monthly (t-bar) mean temperature for the
period 1948–2011, and ait is the standard deviation of that panel.” According to Landis [24],
this approach is adopted from Hendrix and Salehyan’s [25] (pp. 40–41) measure of rainfall
deviation, as the latter study argues that deviations from the panel mean are an optimal
operationalization of the “eco-shock” mechanism. Additionally, I employ standardized
precipitation deviations (see also [25]) using monthly precipitation data (mm/month) from
the Global Precipitation Climatology Project Version 2.2. These data have a spatial coverage
of 2.5 × 2.5-degrees with a longitude resolution (144 × 72) for 1979–2011.
Regarding the control variables, first, there is some evidence linking climate to conflict
and, thus, migration [43,44]. Hence, I include a civil war onset indicator (based on at
least 1000 battle deaths). This information is taken from the Armed Conflict Database [31].
Second, a variable for a state’s (i.e., the state sending/receiving migrants) regime captures
whether people’s choice of leaving their country is also affected by domestic politics in the
source location. Additionally, the regime the destination controls for people’s choices based
on political-related factors. This factor also captures influences like state repression or
human rights violations. I include the polity 2 item taken from the Polity IV data set, which
covers basically all countries in my sample over the entire period [32]. The polity 2 measure
ranges between −10 and +10, with higher values standing for more democratic countries.
High unemployment might also push people to leave their countries looking for better
life conditions. At the same time, low levels of unemployment should be attracting more
migrants. I thus include an indicator for unemployment from the World Bank Development
Indicators. The measure for unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is
without work but available for and seeking employment. For example, in 2000, Greece
was affected by 11.1% of unemployment. The original variable of unemployment suffers
from missing values. To address this issue, I linearly interpolate these missings. This
interpolation explains why some states in the sample then have an unemployment rate of
0. To address any concerns stemming from this treatment, I also present models that omit
the unemployment variable. I also control for population size and GDP per capita using
data from Gleditsch [33]. These measures are log-transformed to reduce their distributions’
skewness, because some countries are much wealthier and larger than others. Finally, in
light of the dyadic nature of this analysis, I also add a measure on the cultural distance
between states. The rationale behind this item is to capture a truly dyadic influence on
emigration, i.e., whether cultural similarities impact on emigrants’ choice of the destination
country. To this end, I adopt Kandogan’s [29] revised variable of Kogut and Singh’s [30]
standardized measure of cultural differences.
In Table A1 of this appendix, I examine the impact of climate variability on transna-
tional migration, as discussed in the main analysis (Table 3), while excluding the variable
on precipitation shocks. When including this item as done in Table 2 of the main text, I
only capture the period between 1979 and 2009 because of the limited data availability for
the precipitation variable. Omitting the precipitation item, and increasing the number of
observations as a consequence, does not change the main finding.
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Table A1. The impact of climate variability on emigration—Omitting precipitation.
Model 1 Model 2
Temperature shock 0.14 *** 0.10 ***
(lag)—Origin (0.02) (0.02)





Constant 3.42 *** 16.29 ***
(0.00) (1.20)
Obs. 1,218,626 446,279
Lagged dependent variable Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes





Notes: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered by countries are in parentheses; *** p < 0.01; the
results are based on a sample for the 1960–2009 period as I omit the precipitation variable; control variables are
included in Model 2 for the estimation but omitted from presentation.
Table A2 shows the short-term effects of climate variability on transnational migration
(based on Figure 3 in the main text). For example, the results indicate that the coefficient
estimate of Temperature shock (lag)-origin is 0.12 (based on specifications of Model 2
in Table 3 of the main analysis). While this is a rather small impact, it does not come
unexpectedly; the fact remains that the variable is highly statistically significant. In addition,
due to the temporally lagged dependent variable included as a predictor, the coefficient
estimates of all explanatory variables only reflect the short-term effect, i.e., the impact in a
current year (i.e., the short-term effects). Hence, I have calculated the long-term effects of
climate variability on transnational migration. Table A3 shows that the coefficient estimate
of Temperature shock (lag)-origin is 2.61 (based on specifications of Model 2 in Table 3 of
the main analysis).
Table A2. Short-term effects of climate variability.
Marginal Effect Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound
Temperature shock
(lag)—Origin 0.11 0.04 0.17
Temperature shock
(lag)—Destination −0.19 −0.25 −0.13
Precipitation shock
(lag)—Origin −0.17 −0.23 −0.11
Precipitation shock
(lag)—Destination 0.01 −0.05 0.07
Note: Figures are based on Figure 3 (left panel) in the main text.
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Table A3. Asymptotic long-term effects of climate variability.
Marginal Effect Estimate Lower Bound Upper Bound
Temperature shock
(lag)—Origin 2.45 1.01 3.89
Temperature shock
(lag)—Destination −4.31 −5.67 −2.96
Precipitation shock
(lag)—Origin −3.83 −5.22 −2.59
Precipitation shock
(lag)—Destination 0.20 −1.27 1.67
Note: Figures are based on Figure 3 (right panel) in the main text.
I linearly interpolated missing values in the outcome variable, which only reports
values per decade. While this addresses the issue of missing values, it may increase the
risk of inducing another problem: cointegration, particularly since temperature rises on
average more or less linearly as well (but note: temperature shocks do not). Cointegration
may lead to spurious findings. As described by Toll [45]:
“a regression analysis seeks to explain as much as possible of the observed
variation in the dependent variable by the variations in the independent variables.
The variance of a trending variable is dominated by its trend. If an independent
variable has a trend as well, then its variance too is dominated by the trend. More
importantly, the trend in any independent variable can explain a large share of
the trend in the dependent variable. This implies that, in a regression analysis,
the confidence in the parameter estimates is overstated. That is, a regression
analysis will find a statistically significant relationship even when there is none.”
For examining whether cointegration might be an issue, I re-run the analysis only
with the actually observed data, i.e., I drop the linearly interpolated values (Table A4). The
results remain qualitatively the same as in the main analysis (Model 2 in Table 3): I still
obtain evidence for a significantly positive relationship between temperature shocks and
transnational migration. An increase in temperature shocks at home increases the amount
of emigrants whilst and a decrease in temperature shocks in the destination country attracts
more migrants. Additionally, precipitation shocks in the destination country decrease the
number of emigrants whereas this was insignificant in the main analysis.
Table A4. The impact of climate variability on emigration—without linearly interpolated data.
Model 1
Temperature shock 0.57 **
(lag)—Origin (0.25)









Lagged dependent variable No
Country fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
Clustered standard errors (dyad) Yes
R2 0.52
RMSE 12.89
Notes: Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered by countries are in parentheses; control variables
are included in Model 2 for the estimation but omitted from presentation; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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I also examined the predictive power of the main explanatory variables of interest via
in-sample predictions techniques. That is, I analyze how accurate “conditional statements
about a phenomenon for which the researcher actually has data, i.e., the outcome variable
has been observed” [46] (p. 311) are. I rely on one measure for assessing the in-sample
prediction power: Theil’s U According to Böhmelt and Bove [47] (p. 3), “Theil’s U is the
square root of the ratio between the sum of squared prediction errors of a baseline model
and the sum of squared prediction errors of a naïve model; that is, a no-change prediction.
If Theil’s U is larger than 1, the model actually performs worse than the naïve model; values
for Theil’s U smaller than 1 indicate that the “theoretically informed model” performs
better than the naïve specification.”
For my baseline model (Model 1 in Table 3 in the main analysis), Theil’s U is at
0.83798313. Table A5 below gives an overview of the model’s in-sample prediction power
and the individual contribution each of the variables employed in Model 2 makes. The con-
tributions of each variable is measured by calculating the difference between the value of
the baseline model’s Theil’s U values on one hand and, on the other hand, the correspond-
ing goodness-of-fit measure’s value calculated for a model that discards that particular
item. For example, excluding Temperature shock-origin (lag) from the baseline model leads
to an increase in Theil’s U from 0.83680681 to 0.83682049. Therefore, Temperature shock
at the origin country does contribute to the model’s overall prediction power by 0.001368
units according to Theil’s U. Finally, note that none of these predictors included in Model 2
diminishes the predictive power. In other words, Theil’s U n decrease when leaving out an
item from the model specification. Ultimately, the specifications used in the main analysis
perform well in predicting transnational migration and clarifying the robustness of this
empirical analysis.
Table A5. In-sample prediction power.
Excluded Variables Mean U ∆U
None (baseline model) 0.83680681 –
Temperature shock (lag)—Origin 0.83682049 0.001368
Temperature shock
(lag)—Destination 0.83684651 0.00397
Precipitation shock (lag)—Origin 0.83684564 0.003883
Precipitation shock
(lag)—Destination 0.8368069 0.000009
Notes: Results are based on Model 1 in Table 3 of the main analysis; difference in Theil’s U multiplied by 100 to
facilitate reading. Control variables included for estimation but omitted from presentation.
To further examine whether unemployment rates play a significant role for the choice
of the destination country, I interact temperature shock at the origin country and unem-
ployment rate at the destination country (Figure A1 in this appendix). The information
on unemployment comes from the World Bank indicators and it show the percentage of
total labour force that is unemployed. The results show that emigration increases at high
levels of temperature shock at the origin country and low levels of unemployment in the
destination country. This means that emigrants do consider the economic characteristics
of the country they are migrating, also while taking into account the climatic influences I
focus on.
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Figure A1. Average marginal effects of temperature shock in origin country and unemployment in 
destination country. Vertical bars are 90 percent confidence intervals; horizontal red line repre-
sents a marginal effect of 0; estimates are based on Model 2 (Table 3 in the main analysis). The 
values of the unemployment variable are linearly interpolated due to missing values. 
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